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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A 
POST-IRAQ, POST-DARFUR WORLD: IS 
THERE NOW A DUTY TO PREVENT 
GENOCIDE EVEN WITHOUT 
SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL? 
SARAH MAZZOCHI* 
Scores of ink have been spilled to address the question of whether there 
is a duty to prevent genocide even without Security Council approval.  
Most who have written on the subject have come down firmly supporting 
the United Nation’s Charter and the general prohibition on the use of 
force except for in situations involving self-defense or where use of force 
has been approved by the Security Council.  One of the main reasons 
scholars have sided with the sovereignty1-Security Council side of the 
debate is that aggressive states, if they could, would use unilateral 
intervention for human rights reasons as a pretext for furthering their 
  
 * B.A., Brown University; J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law; LL.M 
International Legal Studies Program, International Human Rights, American University Washington 
College of Law.  The author would like to thank Professor Keith Hagan for inspiring this article by 
showing Hotel Rwanda in his Human Rights seminar.  The author would also like to thank Professor 
Juan Méndez for his contributions to this article.  Lastly, the author would like to thank her 
grandmother Ellen Gallagher for enabling her to live in Washington, DC as a poor law student and 
for passing down her love of all things international.         
 1. Sovereignty, or rather the sovereign equality of all states, is often invoked as the main 
reason intervention is lawful only with Security Council approval under the UN Charter.  
Essentially, because all states are equal in the eyes of public international law, no state has the right 
to interfere with another’s sovereign territory unless there is an extremely good reason to do so, such 
as to prevent genocide.   See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1.   
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own illegitimate policies, such as Hitler did when Germany invaded 
Sudetenland in 1938.2 
After a brief lull in human rights violations following the end of World 
War II, human rights violations, especially genocide, seemed to emerge 
again overnight in the 1990s and extend into the first decade of the 21st 
century.  Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost, and, in some cases, 
the Security Council failed to act.  The failure of the Security Council to 
take action renewed the vigor of some scholars calling for a change in 
the international legal landscape to properly address this reality.  
Whatever momentum the legal community seemed to have gained in 
recognizing a change in the law of humanitarian intervention was 
brought to a halt during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  However, 
the genocide that occurred just a short while later in Darfur has renewed 
this debate.  And so, the question remains: Is there now a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention in a post-Iraq, post-Darfur world?  
This Article seeks to answer that question.        
Part I will address the background and historical evolution of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention as well as give examples of state action or 
inaction in cases of genocide.  Part I will also give the legal framework 
for the U.N. Genocide Convention.  Part II will discuss the law of 
humanitarian intervention as it is commonly accepted today.  Part III will 
point to the future and argue that the law of humanitarian intervention 
should be, going forward, a jus cogens norm.  Part IV will offer a brief 
conclusion about humanitarian intervention in situations amounting to 
genocide, and it will point to what the future will likely be when there is 
a duty to prevent genocide, regardless of Security Council approval.      
I. BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION 
A. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES  
(i) 1960-1990s 
By some estimates, the use of force by states has occurred some 690 
times since the passage of the UN Charter in 1945 until 1989.3  It has 
been most often justified on the grounds of self-defense pursuant to 
Article 51.4  However, many examples of unilateral humanitarian 
  
 2. Letter from Reich Chancellor Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain (Sept. 23, 1938), The 
Crisis in Czechoslovakia Apr. 24-Oct. 13, 1938, in 19 INT’L CONCILIATION 433, 433-35 (1938).     
 3. See U.N. Charter; Herbert K. Tillema, Risks of Battle and the Deadlines of War:  
International Armed Conflicts, paper presented to the INT’L STUDIES ASS’N, San Diego, Apr. 16-29.   
 4. U.N. Charter art. 51; Tillema, supra note 3.   
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intervention date back to the 1970s.5  For instance, in 1971, India 
invaded East Pakistan under the guise that it was an act of self defense 
and because of the inhuman conditions suffered by the Bengali 
population.6  The Security Council, and particularly the United States, 
objected to India’s use of force.7 Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 to 
stop the Khmer Rouge’s genocide against its own people.8  Vietnam also 
relied on the self-defense justification.9  The Security Council debated 
this proposition with many states and asserted unilateral intervention for 
human rights reasons was not permitted under the U.N. Charter.10  
Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, and toppled the dictator Idi Amin 
who had committed many atrocities against his people.11  Tanzania 
partially relied on humanitarian grounds to do so.12  The attack was not 
debated in the United Nations at all, but the international community 
later derided Tanzania’s actions.13  France intervened in the Central 
African Republic in 1979 after the atrocities committed by Emperor 
Bokassa.14  The Organization of African Unity Judicial Commission 
condemned his actions, but there was still no mandate by the world 
community to intervene for humanitarian reasons.15     
(ii) Rwanda (1994) 
Perhaps the most famous modern example of the world community’s 
inaction over gross human rights violations occurred in Rwanda in the 
mid-1990s.  In 1994, the Hutu majority in Rwanda began killing the 
Tutsi minority population.16  Rwanda’s ethnic clash between the Hutus 
and Tutsis was predominately a product of European colonialism.17  
Germany, and later Belgium, colonized what is now known as Rwanda 
in the 19th century and made a class system based on skin tone and facial 
  
 5. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 n.29 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd. ed. 
2005).   
 6. Id.   
 7. Id. 
 8. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:  ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES 
ONCE AND FOR ALL 135 (Bookings Inst. Press, 2008). 
 9. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 373 n.29.   
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.   
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.   
 15. Id.   
 16. Leilani F. Battiste, The Case for Intervention in the Humanitarian Crisis in the Sudan, 11 
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 61 (2005).  For Hollywood’s take on the Rwandan Genocide, see 
Hotel Rwanda.   
 17. SARAH HYMOWITZ & AMELIA PARKER, GROUP ONE:  THE HUTUS AND THE TUTSIS, 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/center/rwanda/jigsaw1.pdf?rd=1 (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2011).   
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features.18  The lighter skinned Tutsis were treated as being racially 
superior to the darker skinned Hutus.19  Over the years, this created a 
great deal of animosity towards the Tutsis, and the group was 
periodically attacked.20  After 200,000 Tutsis were forced to flee to 
Uganda, they regrouped into what was known as the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front.21  Their aim was to achieve political equality for the Tutsis and to 
counter the predominately Hutu government.22   
Violence escalated throughout the early 1990’s and erupted in 1994.23  In 
March of the same year, weapons were given to Hutu civilians.24  A 
month later, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed when 
his plane was shot down.25  The Tutsis, particularly the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, were blamed for the attack.26  The Rwandan army and 
armed militia were deployed against the alleged perpetrators, and for the 
next 100 days, a genocidal fury swept the small African nation.27  Most 
of those killed were unarmed Tutsi civilians.28     
Intervention was non-existent during the crisis.29  What is more 
disturbing is that after the killings began, the U.N. Security Council cut 
the U.N. forces in Rwanda from 2,500 down to a bare 800.30  The crisis 
lasted for 100 days, and, when it was over, approximately 800,000 
Rwandans had died.31  At the time, the U.N. and the world community 
refused to call the crisis genocide.32    Several members of the Security 
Council chose not to use the term “genocide” to describe what was 
happening in Rwanda, because, if it was genocide, these states believed 
there was a corresponding duty to prevent it.33   
The failure to provide humanitarian intervention in Rwanda is considered 
one of the worst international mistakes in recent history.  Five years after 
the killing began, President Clinton traveled to Rwanda to apologize for 
  
 18. Id.   
 19. See Battiste, supra note 16, at 62. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 61. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 61-62. 
 32. Id. at 62. 
 33. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THE CRIME OF CRIMES 529 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd. ed. 2009). 
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not intervening, and he pledged that the United States would never again 
fail to prevent such a catastrophe.34   
(iii) Kosovo (1999) 
The most commonly discussed example in recent memory of 
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization, and 
without a self-defense justification, was NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
in 1999.35   The Security Council had not authorized the intervention in 
Kosovo, but many argued the need to use force was justified because of 
the humanitarian catastrophe committed by the Serbs in Kosovo.36  The 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Italy, among others, supported the intervention.37  Other 
states such as Russia, China, Cuba, Belarus, Ukraine, Namibia, and India 
objected to the use of force because the Security Council had not 
authorized it.38  Afterward, the integrity of the entire international system 
was called into question with many considering the Kosovo intervention 
justified on moral grounds because of the scale of the crimes against 
humanity committed in the region, despite the fact that the intervention 
was not authorized by the Security Council. 39     
In 1999, NATO forces intervened in Kosovo to stop Slobodan 
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing crusade against ethnic Albanians.40  
Milosevic's goal was to dismantle any opposition to his regime and 
permanently establish an ethnic balance in the region.41  NATO justified 
the military intervention on the grounds that it was necessary for the 
region’s overall stability.42  The Security Council failed to authorize the 
intervention because of Russia’s veto.43  
Despite not having Security Council approval for the intervention, U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan was supportive of NATO’s campaign.  He 
stated, “‘[there] are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the 
pursuit of peace.’”44   He went on to say that "'ethnic cleansers' and those 
  
 34. Battiste, supra note 16, at 63. 
 35. See CASSESE, supra note 5, at 373 n.29.    
 36. Id.   
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. EVANS, supra note 8, at 129. 
 40. Battiste, supra note 16, at 59-60. 
 41. Id at 60. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, GEORGETOWN LAW 
MAGAZINE (Spring 2002), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/alumni/publications/2002/magazine/ 
stromseth.html.   
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‘guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights’ will find no 
justification or refuge in the U.N. Charter."45   Furthermore, after NATO 
intervened, the Swedish-sponsored Kosovo Commission sought to make 
the intervention more acceptable by distinguishing between legitimacy 
and legality.46  It contended that while the intervention may not have 
been legal, it was nevertheless legitimate.47   
(iv) Iraq (2003) 
The Security Council was again bypassed when the United States and her 
allies invaded Iraq in 2003 based on notions of self-defense found in 
U.N. Charter Article 51.48  The alleged goals were to disarm Iraq of 
weapons of mass destruction, end Saddam Hussein’s support of 
terrorism, and free the Iraqis from a brutal regime.49  However, no 
weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, which resulted in the 
entire legitimacy of the military operation being called into question by 
many.   
The cause of Iraq’s intervention in 2003 was found in Iraq’s non-
compliance with the Gulf War’s cease-fire terms throughout the 
1990’s.50  Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted after the U.N.’s 
somewhat ineffective handling of Iraq’s non-compliance during this 
time.51  Resolution 1441 gave Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament obligations,” and “set up an enhanced inspection regime 
with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament 
process” established by Resolution 687 and other resolutions.52  
However, it was evident that the United States would resort to force if 
necessary.53  The Security Council also declared that “Iraq has been and 
remains in material breach” of its disarmament obligations, and further 
failures to comply with Resolution 1441 would “constitute a further 
material breach.”54  The British viewed Resolution 1441 as a “second 
  
 45. Id.   
 46. EVANS, supra note 8, at 139. 
 47. Id.  (Fourteen principles were used to determine legality versus legitimacy.)  
 48. Id. at 132. 
 49. President George W. Bush’s Radio Address, President Discusses Beginning of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (Mar. 22, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2003/03/20030322.html.   
 50. See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous 
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 
150-52 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat 
of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 724,724-25 (1998). 
 51. Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
628, 630 (2003).   
 52. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
 53. Stromseth, supra note 51, at 630. 
 54. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52, ¶ 1, 4. 
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resolution,” and wanted to achieve a consensus in the Security Council.55  
The United Kingdom especially wanted to enhance the legitimacy of any 
later forceful action by working within the confines of the U.N. 
Charter.56   
The United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and his Foreign 
Secretary, Jack Straw, argued for a unified force with the Security 
Council’s approval.57  France refused to authorize force under any 
circumstances.58  The United States, the United Kingdom, and several 
other notable allies forcibly intervened anyway, which was supposedly 
acceptable under Security Council Resolution 1441.  However, their 
actions have been greatly criticized.59  Nevertheless, immediately before 
the invasion, Tony Blair spoke about the use of force and its consistency 
with Security Council demands on Iraq.60  Blair argued that the U.N.’s 
weak stance on Iraq’s non-compliance undercut its credibility and sent a 
poor message to other dictators and tyrants.61  He stated, “to will the ends 
but not the means . . . would do more damage in the long run to the U.N. 
than any other course.”62           
Some have called the Iraq military intervention the "death" of the U.N. 
Charter and the end of "the grand attempt to subject the use of force to 
the rule of law."63  Experts agree that this morbid assertion was 
premature, but it was clear that the pendulum had swung towards the use 
of legitimate and legal force only with Security Council approval.64   
However, the question now is whether the legitimacy of the use of force 
only with Security Council approval is still true after the atrocities 
committed in Sudan, especially in the Darfur region.    
(v) Sudan (2003-Present) 
Sudan is the largest state in Africa.65  It has also been constantly 
immersed in civil wars since its independence from Great Britain in 
  
 55. Stromseth, supra note 51, at 631. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Tony Blair, PM Statement Opening Iraq Debate in Parliament (Mar. 18, 2003), 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16, 24 (May/June 
2003).   
 64. See Stromseth, supra note 51, at 629. 
 65. Battiste, supra note 16, at 51. 
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1956.66  The predominately Muslim government exists in the North, 
while most of the non-Muslims, many of whom are Christian – mostly 
Catholics and Anglicans – reside in the South.67  Since its independence, 
over two million people, mostly Christian, have been killed in the 
conflict.68   
The crisis primarily took place in a region known as Darfur, which is a 
diverse area home to Arabs and other African groups including the 
Masalit, Fur, and the Zaghawa.69  These three groups, who are mainly 
farmers, have borne the brunt of North Sudan’s policies.70   The early 
part of the conflict involved a clash over land between Arab nomads and 
the African farming villages.71  The Fur began resisting nomadic 
intrusions on their land, which resulted in government hostilities against 
the Fur.72  Eventually, the Fur formed militias, which later became part 
of the Sudanese Liberation Army (“SLA”), a rebel group.73  In the 1990s, 
Arab nomads moved onto land mostly held by the Masalit farmers, 
which resulted in further armed hostilities between the two groups.74   
The government ended the violence, but tension continued between the 
Arab nomads and black African groups.75  During the following years, 
the Sudanese government failed to improve roads and public services 
used primarily by black African groups and awarded top government 
posts to Arabs.76     
Hostilities boiled over early in the morning on April 25, 2003 when a 
SLA bomb exploded at a small airport where Sudanese soldiers were 
located.77  The SLA then killed the remaining soldiers, took over the 
military outpost, and captured the head of the Sudanese Air Force.78  
Sudan’s government responded by coordinating air strikes with the local, 
newly-armed Arab tribesmen known as the janjaweed.79   This strategy 
  
 66. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Sudan (2011), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html . 
 67. Hope for the Future International, Christianity in Southern Sudan: The History of 
Christianity in Sudan, http://www.hopeforthefutureinternational.org/about-southern-sudan-
christianity.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2011); Battiste, supra note 16, at 51. 
 68. Battiste, supra note 16, at 51. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 52. 
 72. Id. at 52. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 53 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur, 80 THE NEW YORKER 58, (Aug. 30, 2004).  Available 
at:    http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/08/30/040830fa_fact1.  
 79. Id. 
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laid the foundation for the later brutalities committed against the 
unarmed black African citizens, including mass murder and rape.80  
Since 2003, at least 70,000 civilians have been killed in Darfur and 
approximately 1.85 million people have been internally displaced.81   
Again, the international community failed to act promptly to prevent this 
humanitarian catastrophe.  In fact, at first, only the United States referred 
to this crisis as genocide.82  Over a year after the conflict first began, the 
SLA and the Sudanese Government signed a temporary cease-fire with 
the African Union agreeing to send unarmed troops to monitor the 
situation.83  It was only in late July 2004 that the Security Council passed 
a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the fighting forces and 
threatened the government with other actions such as freezing assets or 
issuing a travel ban.84  Finally, in February 2005, the Security Council 
approved sending 10,000 troops as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission 
– nearly two years after the violence began.85   
In 2008, Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s current president, was indicted for 
genocide by the International Criminal Court.86  Southern Sudan held a 
referendum on whether to remain part of Sudan in early 2011.87  The 
people of Southern Sudan overwhelmingly voted for their independence 
from the North and will likely become an independent state by July 
2011.88      
Having laid out the historical framework for intervention with or without 
Security Council approval up to the present day, it is now necessary to 
  
 80. Battiste, supra note 16, at 53-55. 
 81. Id. at 49. 
 82. See Dana Milbank, Denying Genocide in Darfur – And Americans Their Coca-Cola, 
WASH. POST, May 31, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/05/30/AR2007053002157.html. See also U.N. News Centre, U.N. Commission Finds Sudanese 
Government Responsible for Crimes in Darfur (Feb. 1, 2005)(The United Nations referred to the 
crisis as a series of “indiscriminate attacks” but not genocide). Available at: http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13199&CR=sudan&Crl=; Battiste, supra note 16, at 50. 
 83. Battiste, supra note 16, at 58. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 50, 58-59. 
 86. Sudanese President is Charged with Genocide, MSNBC, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25671505/ns/world_news-africa/ 
 87. Josh Kron, Big Push in South Sudan Before Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/africa/10sudan.html?partner=rss&emc=rss 
 88. Faith Karimi, Report: Vote For Souther Sudan Independence Nearly Unanimous, CNN, 
Jan. 22, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-22/world/sudan.referendum.results_1_preliminary-
results-official-results-election-officials?_s=PM:WORLD; Sudan Referendum: What’s Being Voted 
On and What Will Happen?, THE TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
africaandindianocean/sudan/8246615/Sudan-referendum-whats-being-voted-on-and-what-will-happen. 
html (last visited May 30, 2011). 
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turn to the Genocide Convention and how humanitarian intervention 
relates to the crime of genocide.   
B. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION  
The definition of genocide is the “intentional killing, destruction, or 
extermination of a group or members of a group as such . . . .”89  
Historically, genocide was thought of as a crime against humanity, not as 
its own distinct offense.90  For instance, the Tokyo International Tribunal 
never specifically mentioned genocide when dealing with the Holocaust; 
instead, the crime was considered was one of persecution.91   
Genocide became a specific crime in 1948 with the adoption of the U.N. 
Genocide Convention.92  The Genocide Convention carefully defines the 
crime: it punishes more than genocide itself but also acts connected with 
genocide, such as conspiracy to commit genocide; it affirms that 
genocide can occur during wartime and peacetime; and it establishes 
individual criminal responsibility along with international state 
responsibility.93   The Genocide Convention is widely acknowledged as 
representing customary international law as well as holding to a status of 
jus cogens.94  Importantly, jus cogens is a peremptory norm of 
international law upon which no derogation is possible.95  Accordingly, 
jus cogens is afforded the highest status in international law and, in some 
ways, is akin to natural law.96   
The Genocide Convention has a specific act and specific intent 
requirement.97  It requires that the genocidal conduct (a) include the 
killing of members of a racial, ethnic, or religious group; (b) cause 
serious mental or bodily harm to members of the group; (c) bring about 
the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) prevent births 
within the group; or (e) forcibly transfer children of the group to another 
group.98   The conduct does not need to be systematic or widespread for 
there to be genocide, although this is often the case.99   
  
 89. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 442.   
 90. Id. at 442-43. 
 91. Id. at 443. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 444. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW:  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 357-424 (Coronet Books, Inc).  
 97. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 444-45. 
 98. Id. at 444. 
 99. Id. 
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The mens rea, or specific intent, of genocide is that the perpetrator 
committed one of the aforementioned acts intending to destroy the group 
in whole or in part.100  Murder, for example, is the means while the goal 
or end, would be the group’s destruction.  Therefore, genocide cannot 
exist when the conduct is negligent or even reckless.101         
Although the Genocide Convention does many things well, it is not 
without its problems.  For example, the Genocide Convention’s 
definition of genocide has been criticized as not being broad enough to 
include cases of cultural genocide or genocide on political grounds.102  
Moreover, the enforcement of the Genocide Convention has not been 
very effective.103  In the history of the U.N., the General Assembly 
pronounce a case of genocide only once in Sabra and Shatila in 1982.104  
Moreover, in the sixty years since the Genocide Convention’s passage, 
very few prosecutions for genocide have occurred globally.105   
(i) The Duty to Prevent Genocide 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention provides that contracting states 
have a duty to prevent genocide.106  In practice, in 1993, with the 
outbreak of war in Bosnia, some argued that states have the duty to 
prevent genocide.107  As Judge Lauterpacht wrote, “[t]he duty to 
‘prevent’ genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties and is a duty owed 
by each party to every other [erga omnes].”108  This viewpoint 
corresponded with the early International Court of Justice case 
Barcelona Traction.109   
In the 2005 Outcome Document of the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) embraced this 
“responsibility to protect” for crimes of genocide.110  The Court made this 
responsibility a treaty obligation for those states that ratified Genocide 
  
 100. Id. at 445. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 443. 
 103. See UNGA Resolution 37/123 D of 16 December 1982 (the only time the General 
Assembly proclaimed a situation constituted genocide under the Convention.).   
 104. See id.  
 105. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 443 n.19.   
 106. Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.1, Jan. 12, 1951, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 107. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 527 (Judge Lauterpacht’s comments).  
 108. Id. 
 109. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 5, 1970); see also SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 527 (Judge Lauterpacht’s comments).  
 110. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 
2005).   
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Convention Article IX without reservation.111  Moreover, regarding the 
responsibility to protect, the Court saw no distinction between genocide 
committed on a state’s own soil and genocide committed elsewhere.112  It 
is now clear that the duty to prevent genocide is not confined to a state’s 
own territory.113   
In the Case Concerning the Application of Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), the ICJ also affirmed that, when carrying out 
the duty to prevent genocide, states must still act according to established 
international law principles and with respect for the U.N. Charter.114  The 
Court did not go so far as to hold that the duty to prevent genocide, or the 
responsibility to protect those groups suffering from genocide, trumps 
the U.N. Charter or allows states to intervene without Security Council 
approval.115  Nevertheless, as renowned experts agree, the duty to prevent 
genocide is “very much a work in progress.”116  
In the Case Concerning the Application of Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), the International Court of Justice further 
clarified the duty to prevent genocide.  State responsibility under the duty 
to prevent genocide, according to the Court, is triggered when the state 
involved fails to take all measures within its power to prevent the 
crime.117  The obligation “varies greatly from one State to another,” and 
depends on a state’s capacity to influence events.118  Factors such as 
geographic proximity and the strength of ties between the states should 
be considered.119     
Having now established what the Genocide Convention is and what it 
does, the next section will discuss the current law of humanitarian 
intervention.   
  
 111. Id.   
 112. Id; see also SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 524. 
 113. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 524. 
 114. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 426 (Feb. 26).   
 115. Id; see also SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 525. 
 116. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 533. 
 117. Id. at 521. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 521-22. 
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II. THE LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS IT 
STANDS TODAY  
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION  
U.N. Charter Article 2(4) makes clear that all states “shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force . . . .”120  According 
to the U.N. Charter, states are justified in using force only when 
authorized by the Security Council to prevent the most serious threats to 
peace under Article 42, or in cases of self-defense under Article 51.121  
Therefore, in many ways, international peace and security firmly rests 
with the five permanent members of the Security Council:  The United 
States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China.  
(i) Unilateral Intervention Without Security Council Approval  
By the late 1990s, many international experts suggested that, due to the 
responsibility to protect and the duty to prevent genocide found in the 
Genocide Convention, unilateral humanitarian intervention was required 
even in cases where the Security Council failed to authorize such 
action.122  The concept of humanitarian intervention without Security 
Council approval, although not a new phenomenon, took further root in 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.123  It was even argued that the duty to 
prevent genocide, not just the duty not to engage in genocide, had 
reached the level of jus cogens.124  Therefore, any incompatible duty – 
even one in the U.N. Charter – could not stand in the way of states 
fulfilling this jus cogens obligation.125    
More recently, however, justifying humanitarian intervention when the 
Security Council has not authorized the use of force has been not been 
favored by the international community in the wake of Iraq’s invasion in 
2003.126  For instance, the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua 
(merits) (§268) held that state parties agreed that “whether the response 
to the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of 
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-
defence.”127  Experts like Antonio Cassese, despite some state practices 
  
 120. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. 
 121. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51; CASSESE, supra note 5, at 373. 
 122. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 530.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 531. 
 127. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 194 (June 27). 
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to the contrary, have gone so far as writing, “ . . . legally entitling 
individual States to take forcible measures to induce a State engaging in 
gross and large-scale violations of human rights to terminate such 
violations, has not crystallized.”128   
However, even Cassese notes that the opinio juris for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is internationally widespread.129  Opinio juris, 
after state practice, is the second element in customary international law, 
and it stands for the position that states act under a belief that they are 
legally obligated to do so.130  For example, the 2000 Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, a treaty ratified by 53 African States, holds that there 
is a right to intervene, if allowed by the African Assembly, when there 
are grave human rights violations such as genocide.131  This seems, at the 
least, to directly contravene the U.N. Charter, which requires that the 
Security Council, and only the Security Council, may authorize the use 
of force.    
The World Summit in 2005 demonstrated a renewed commitment to the 
U.N.’s general prohibition on the use of force, especially unilateral use of 
force.132  The Summit Outcome Document, which was unanimously 
decided, once again asserted that the Security Council was the sole 
international body for authorizing the use of force.133  Therefore, it seems 
likely that the law surrounding humanitarian intervention continues to 
require that the use of force be authorized by the Security Council or be 
used in cases of self-defense.   
Having reaffirmed the international commitment to the Security Council, 
the question now turns to what the future of international law will be for 
intervention in mass atrocities.   
III. THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS JUS 
COGENS  
At least one advocate for human rights has expressed the opinion that 
“[a]ll notions of sovereignty with respect to Rwanda should be 
  
 128. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 374.   
 129. Id. 
 130. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 69 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (“[State practice] . . . is the repetition of conduct by an increasing 
number of States, accompanied at some stage by the belief that this conduct is not only dictated by 
practical (economic, military, political) reasons, but is also imposed by some sort of legal command 
[opinio juris].”). 
 131. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 374. 
 132. EVANS, supra note 8, at 132. 
 133. Id. 
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completely forgotten and we should just go in and stop the killing.”134  
While the law may currently favor the position that humanitarian 
intervention is only legal when authorized by the Security Council, or in 
cases of self-defense, the question is, should it be? 
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PRETEXT 
ARGUMENT JUSTIFYING NON-INTERVENTION  
Perhaps the main reason scholars, international lawyers, and the 
international community support the principles in U.N. Charter Article 
2(4) and the idea that the use of force is only justified in cases of self-
defense or when authorized by the Security Council is that, if states 
could, they would use humanitarian intervention as a pretext for 
satisfying their own selfish ends.135  Recent empirical evidence, however, 
suggests that unilateral humanitarian intervention would have little effect 
on the frequency of unjustified and aggressive wars, and in some cases, 
may even reduce the number of such wars.136  According to at least one 
scholar, essentially not enough attention is paid to domestic political and 
social factors forcing state officials to justify their aggressive 
tendencies.137  Moreover, “encouraging aggressive states to justify using 
force as an exercise of humanitarian intervention can facilitate conditions 
for peace between those states and their prospective targets.”138 
Therefore, if new empirical evidence shows that pretext is not one of the 
horrible consequences awaiting the legalization of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, little else should justify states not meeting the 
duty to prevent genocide, or having that duty be regarded as jus cogens.     
B. RECOGNIZING THE DUTY TO PREVENT GENOCIDE AS JUS COGENS  
Those who envision a different method of preventing human rights 
catastrophes rather than relying on action by the Security Council 
typically do so in two main ways.139  First, there are those who argue that 
customary international law has indeed crystallized to allow state 
  
 134. Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, May 1994, quote in L.A TIMES May 11, 1994, at B7. ; see 
also Ian Browlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS 139 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (calling this view the position of the Kind-
Hearted Gunmen).  
 135. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 
113 (2006). 
 136. Id. at 107. (“In this article, I argue that it is just as likely, or even more likely, that the 
impact on states would be the opposite. Drawing on recent empirical studies, I contend that 
legalizing [unilateral humanitarian intervention] should in important respects discourage wars with 
ulterior motives.”).    
 137. Id. at 109-110. 
 138. Id. at 110. 
 139. EVANS, supra note 8, at 136. 
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intervention for serious human rights reasons even without authority 
from the Security Council.140  Second, there are those who believe the 
Security Council system should be strongly reformed or replaced 
entirely.141  This Article accepts a third justification for rethinking the law 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention – that the duty to prevent 
genocide should be, if it is not already, jus cogens. 
Under international law, only the highest of legal principles is afforded 
jus cogens status.142  According to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, jus cogens derives “their status from fundamental values 
held by the international community, as violations of such preemptory 
norms are considered to shock the conscience of humankind and 
therefore bind the international community as a whole, irrespective of 
protest, recognition or acquiescence.”143  Common examples of jus 
cogens norms are the prohibitions on genocide and slavery, although 
many scholars have noted that the duty to prevent genocide must be 
counted among this group.144   
Moreover, the founder of modern international law, Jesuit scholar 
Francisco Suarez, strongly believed that the right of self-defense is the 
“greatest of rights.”145  Following this logic, some have argued that the 
duty to prevent genocide as jus cogens naturally flows from even the 
foundation of international law.146  As jus cogens, the duty to prevent 
genocide would be superior to all other international obligations, 
including the sole right of the Security Council to approve the use of 
force found in U.N. Charter Article 42 and the right of self-defense in 
Article 51.147    
Conversely, international scholar William Schabas rejects the idea that a 
jus cogens duty to prevent genocide could somehow trump the U.N. 
Charter.  He writes: 
  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting Genocide a Human 
Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1327 (2006); M.N. Shaw, Genocide and International Law, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 797, 800 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989); Louis 
Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under the Rule of Law, 24 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 490-91 (1991); Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: A Killing that No 
Respectable Government Can Condone, AI Index AMR 51/033/2003 (Mar. 4, 2003). 
 143. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Report No. 62/02 (Oct. 22, 
2002).    
 144. See id; Kopel et al., supra note 142, at 1328. 
 145. Kopel et al., supra note 142, at 1328. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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Perhaps the most serious objection to the idea that humanitarian 
intervention to prevent genocide is permissible because it is a jus 
cogens norm is the fact that the prevention of the use of force 
subject to the two exceptions mentioned in the Charter, Chapter 
VII action and self-defence, is also a jus cogens norm.148    
Other scholars like Mark Toufayan disagree with Schabas’ 
interpretation.149  Schabas fails to fully distinguish between the 
prohibition against genocide, which is jus cogens, and the duties flowing 
from the norm.150  The relationship between the duty to prevent genocide 
and the prohibition against the use of force do not conflict, because “an 
intervening state or group of states agrees to violate a jus cogens rule in 
order to prevent the violation of another rule of the same character.”151     
Moreover, because these are competing equal jus cogens norms – the 
duty to prevent genocide versus the prohibition on the use of force found 
in U.N. Charter Article 2(4) – methods of reconciliation should be 
used.152  Accordingly, the two competing norms should be interpreted 
harmoniously so that the apparent conflict is not, in fact, genuine.153  For 
example, U.N. Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force only in a 
“manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”154 
 However, the duty to prevent genocide is consistent with the “Purposes 
of the United Nations,” because preventing genocide, at its essence, is 
about “reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human rights,” and “[saving] 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” – language found in the 
Preamble to the U.N. Charter.155  Lastly, the duty to prevent genocide is 
an absolutist principle, unlike the prohibition on the use of force in 
Article 2(4), which permits two exceptions.156  Therefore, if ever in 
conflict, the duty to prevent genocide should always prevail.  
The duty to prevent genocide will be seen as a jus cogens obligation 
sometime in the near future, if it is not already.  As seen above, there 
  
 148. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THE CRIME OF CRIMES 502. 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000) 
 149. Mark Toufayan, The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical 
Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 233, 257-258 (2005).   
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th sess, May 1-June 9, July 3-
Aug. 11, 2006, 25, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.682 (2006).  
 153. Id. at 27. 
 154. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. 
 155. U.N. Charter preamble.   
 156. See id. at arts. 41, 52. 
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need not be a conflict between the prohibition on the use of force and the 
duty to prevent genocide.  Moreover, the fear that states will use 
humanitarian intervention as a pretext for their own aggressive 
tendencies is not empirically supported.  Therefore, little stands in the 
way of international law allowing states the right to intervene in grave 
human rights catastrophes, such as in cases of genocide.  Thus, the duty 
to prevent genocide, like the prohibition on genocide, should be jus 
cogens.           
IV. CONCLUSION  
The old notions of sovereignty cannot be allowed to stand in the way of 
human rights.  International law is changing, and changing quickly.  
Genocide is rightfully considered the “crime of crimes,”157 and 
international law should reflect this.  The law in most instances follows 
reason and prevailing morality, and reason and morality call for greater 
intervention to prevent human rights catastrophes.  The pendulum is 
swinging this way after Sudan.  Someday soon the law will reflect the 
truth that perhaps the only thing worse than genocide itself is knowing 
about it and doing nothing.  Some states, such as the United States, seem 
willing to act – sometimes rightly (Kosovo) and sometimes wrongly 
(Iraq) – to address the gravest human rights violations.  Other states, such 
as Vietnam in Cambodia and France in the Central African Republic, 
have at one time or another also fought against human rights violations.  
Someday soon the duty to prevent genocide will be jus cogens.  Until 
that day, states must be ready to violate international law because the 
international community can ill afford another Sudan, Kosovo, Rwanda, 
or Holocaust. 
  
 157. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 33. 
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